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4 April 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

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SUBJECT: NVN Civilian Casualty Figures and Methodology

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1. This is an addendum to the 4 April ORR memo on casualties in North Vietnam.

memo is for your background information only.

2. The casualty estimates in the ORR memorandum are a combination of independently derived CIA estimates, and DIA estimates refined by CIA analysts. The estimates of the civilian and military casualties resulting from attacks on fixed targets and the military casualties resulting from aerial reconnaissance are DIA estimates weighted by CIA to reflect data obtained other intel-

ligence sources. The estimates of civilian casualties attributable to armed reconnaissance are strictly CIA estimates, since DIA makes no attempt to estimate these casualties.

- 3. The major differences between CIA and DIA estimates are as follows:
 - a) DIA estimates of casualties resulting from attacks on fixed targets are expressed in a broad range of minimum and maximum casualties.* The maximum figures assume that the population in the target area was unwarned; the minimum figures assume warning and full resort to civil defense and protective measures. We have found fairly consistently that the initial attacks on JCS fixed targets have inflicted casualties that are four times greater than the minimum DIA estimates. Consequently, we have weighted the DIA estimates by a factor


^{*} The maximum figure would generally be 10 times greater than the minimum; e.g. 100 - 1,000.

	of four for all initial strikes on JCS fixed targets and accepted the DIA estimates for all targets undergoing restrikes. Thus
	if a DIA casualty estimate for an initial strike is presented as
	ranging from 12-120, we would weight the minimum figure by four and estimate casualties as 48.
	b) The estimates of military casualties resulting from armed reconnsissance are probably the most unreliable of all our casualty estimates. We have accepted DIA factors for estimating these casualties with the exception of specific categories
	c) Civilian casualties resulting from armed reconnaissance
	are estimated only by CIA. We develop our estimates on an all-

	George A. Carver, Jr.
	Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

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2 FEB 1967





Fixed Targets

The basic method of determining casualty estimates for attacks on individual fixed targets rests on a casualty prediction methodology developed by US intelligence analysts. This method is essentially an application of the predictable lethal effects of given types of ordnance to known target environments, particularly their population density. These factors are applied in conjunction with roof cover bomb damage assessments based on photographic analysis, and operations reports from specific attack missions. A number of casualties is determined by multiplying the average lethal area of the bombs dropped in target areas by the population density of the area and the number of structures in the area. These estimates are expressed in a broad range of minimum and maximum casualties.* The maximum figures assume that the population in the target area was unwarned; the minimum figures assume warning and full resort to civil defense and protective measures.

The casualty estimates derived by US intelligence specialists are weighted by CIA

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other sources. We have found fairly consistently that the initial attacks on JCS targets have inflicted casualties that are four times greater than the minimum military estimates. Consequently, we have adjusted the military estimates of minimum number of casualties by a factor of four for all initial strikes on fixed targets, and accepted the minimum estimate for all targets undergoing restrikes.



Armed Reconnaissance



Civilian Casualties

The CIA estimates of casualties resulting from armed reconnaissance strikes are expressed through a casualty/sortie rate

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with adjustments made to account for differences in the population

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^{*} The maximum figure would generally be 10 times greater than the minimum.

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24 January 1968

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NEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Briefing of Coneral Maxwell Taylor

relay a r	equest fro	en General Maxwell Taylor for a briefing.	2
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		I bave never seen General Taylor more testy	

nor more critical of intelligence production. He started out by saying that, as I well knew, he wanted to go in some depth into the matter of North Vietnamese logistics. (This was of course a much narrower field than we had been asked to discuss but Walsh shifted gears admirably.)

statement that no one has ever concentrated on the logistics problem (as opposed, for example, to Order of Baitle). He questioned whether the intelligence community was doing enough on logistics and whether we have on board adequately qualified logisticians. ("We may have a lot of dumb clucks in the rest of the Army, but in logistics we are superb. We should get some of these people, and I don't mean some-body who has just served a tour in G-4.") Walsh said that he thought we had a good understanding of the general nature of the North Vietnamese system although we of course did not have all the details filled in; we feel confident, however, that we have a balanced snough picture so that we could spot situations where our information is inadequate, and we don't believe that it really is inadequate enough to degrade our estimates. He went on to say that the quality of professionalism on logistic matters is good, both in CIA and DIA.

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5. In the course of a discussion which was somewhat disjointed because Ceneral Taylor repeatedly came back to the subject
of logistics although professing interest in a broader briefing. Walsh
managed to show him a number of examples of finished intelligence
and made a good case for the
quality of the intelligence without being unduly defensive.

- 6. During all this General Taylor said that "the system" has not produced fundamental answers but has come up with a number of "unreconciled statements." As examples be cited:
 - a. The figures on enemy killed in action, if sugmented by a reasonable number of wounded, plus MACV's figures on infiltration, add up to "an impossibility." He said that his quarrel here was largely with MACV.
 - b. If the KIA figures are correct, then the woods would have to be full of wounded personnel, but we don't find the m.
 - of supplies is needed to support enemy action in the South represents 's ridiculous figure" when we consider the large numbers of trucks that are continually spotted coming down from the North. Either the figure is wrong or the North Vietnamese are stockpiling for a major offensive.
- 7. With respect to tracks, Mr. Walsh pointed out that we do see surges of trucks from time to time but that the community is in agreement that there is no current excess of trucking which would tend to throw off the agreed figures. General Taylor mentioned reports of inordinately large anothers of tracks moving supplies. In acknowledged that these were from pilot sightings and conceded that they are likely to be highly exaggerated. He agreed with walsh's point that these reports contain a great deal of duplicate counting and never give the direction of travel, so that totals reported should not be used indirectionisately as equating to actual supply movements.
- 3. General Taylor did not ask specifically for anything more from us but seemed to be reflecting a general feeling of malaise about 25X1 the whole problem. We can, I think, take some action:

a.	Propert	for	General	Taylor	logistics	map,

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capacities, etc., which Taylor asked whether we had. I understand this will not be too much of a job to prepare.

- b. Arrange to give him a summary or, if he desires, a briefing on the conclusions reached at the conference on logistics which is scheduled for February 19th in Honolulu.
- c. General Taylor described as highly important the 25X1 need for a detailed study on NVA/VC medical services.

d. Tailor the Vietnamese briefing for the next Board meeting, which in the normal course of events would come around the middle of February, to go a little more deeply into some of the questions raised today by General Taylor. We

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cc: DCI

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
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Return to Walsh.

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FIREIGN SHIPPING TO NORTH VISTNAM IN 1967

1. Ship Arrivals

Buring 1967 there were 386 foreign ship arrivals in North Vietnam, seven were than in 1966. Communist ship arrivals increased only slightly — from 305 to 308 — but there was a major change in their composition.

Soviet arrivals increased from 122 to 181 while Chinese arrivals dropped from 138 to 97. The remaining Communist arrivals included 2% by Polish, A by Bulgarian, and I each by Guban and Albanian ships. Free World arrivals increased from 74 to 72 with only minor changes in composition. Sixty—seven of the arrivals were by British-flag ships, most of them under charter to Communist China and owned or operated by Hong Eong firms known to be controlled by Chinese Communists. The remaining 11 Free World arrivals were by ships flying the Cypriot, Italian, Lebanese, and Maltese flags.

Most of these ships were under North Vietnamsee Charter.

2. Imports and Amounts by Sea

Following a pattern similar to that in 1966, North Vietnam's semborne trade dropped by approximately 10 versent in 1967, from 2.1 to 1.9 million tons. This was the net effect of an increase in imports by see from .9 to 1.3 million tons and a decrease in exports by see from 1.2 to .6 million tons.

a. importo

The increase in North Tietnam's imports by sea from 925,000 tons in 1966 to 1,349,000 tons in 1967 resulted primarily from a rise in bulk food imports (from 78,000 to 447,000 tons) and to a lesser extent from rises in imports of petroleum (from 201,000 to 246,000 tons) and miscellaneous and guneral cargoes (from 407,000 to 495,000 tons). The bulk food imported consisted largely of rice from China and wheat flow from the WELR, much of it brought in to compensate for poor barvests in North Vietram during the year. While imports of many commodities were rising, fertilizer imports dropped from 227,000 tons in 1966 to 147,000 tons in 1967.

Imports from Communist countries increased from \$10,000 to 1,302,000 tops. Imports from the USSR which increased from A24,000 to 532,000 tons made up the largest share. Next in importance were imports from Communist China which increased from 156,000 to 434,000 tens. The remaining imports from Communist countries came from Eastern Buroro, Forth Mores, and Cube.

Imports from Pres World countries decreased from 115,000 tons in 1966 to 48,000 tens in 1967. The most important single source was Cambodia which supplied 29,000 tens. Imports from Jaran dropped from 48,000 to only 2,000 tone and imports from Western Europe from 24,000 to 7,000 tons.

Soviet ships carried the largest share of North Vistranese imports in 1967 - 668,000 tons. Chinese Communist ships carried 241,000 tons; Bustern Burogean, 101,000; and Free World, 326,000.

b. Exports

North Vietnam's exports by see dropped from 1,168,600 tons in 1965 to 573,000 in 1967. Coal exports dropped from 938,000 to 432,000 tons.

Cement exports dropped from 99,000 to 35,000 tons with none taking place after April. Pig iron exports dropped from 40,000 to 22,000 tons with none taking place after May. No exports of apatite, which fell from 318,000 tons in 1965 to 10,000 tons in 1966, took place in 1967. The chief recipients of North Vietnamese exports by see in 1967 were Japan which received 256,000 tons (mostly soal) and China which received 175,000 tons (mostly soal).

3. Consection and Other Problems in Hairlons

Record deliveries of bulk foodstuffs, general cargo, and other imports to Haiphong during the period March through June caused severe exagestion in the port, particularly in May, June, and July. This congestion was reflected in increased accumulations of cargo in open storage areas adjacent to the wharves and, more important, in increased layover times for ships calling at the port. Average layover times for ships that departed Haiphong in April before the congestion became serious were 12 days. During July and August when ships that had arrived in port at the height of the congestion were departing, average layover times for departing ships reached highs of 24 and 33 days with some individual ships reporting stays in port in excess of two ments.

Despite alleviation of the congestion at Haighong as import deliveries degreesed from the record levels attained during the first helf of the year, accumulation of cargo in open storage areas of the port appeared to reach a new high in October. While it is likely that some of these goods were stored

there because of the safe haven provided by the proximity to foreign ships, there is reason to believe that some of it was there because of a slowing of the movement of goods to the interior as a result of the interdiction of radii and highway bridges out of Haiphong by UE bombing in late September and early October. The only reason that accumulations of cargo in Haiphong were not greater is that the North Vietnamese had ferries and portoon bridges to put into operation when the bridges were knocked out and a growing fleet of lighters with which to speed the discharge of cargoes from same-going ships.

Another factor that complicated port operations in Balcheng during 1967 was milting in the shallow approaches to the harbor. There is evidence that the limiting draft in the approaches to the port decreased from 25 feet at the beginning of the year to 25 feet at the end of the year. Such a drop could reduce by more than 1,000 tons the amount of cargo delivered by a 10,000 deadweight ton ship.

Maxwell Taylor

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